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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court err in ordering Dr. 
Koerpel to terminate and distribute the copies of the Defined 
Benefit Pension Plan ("the Plan") to Mrs. Koerpel? 
2. Did the District Court err in awarding custody of 
Joshua John Koerpel and Bardin Blake Koerpel to Mrs. Koerpel? 
3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in 
finding that Dr. Koerpel was the moving force behind all 
business ventures with which he and Mrs. Koerpel were 
associated and that, consequently, Dr. Koerpel should inherit 
all business assets and business liabilities? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dr. Barry J. Koerpel appeals the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce entered by the 
Honorable David Roth, Judge of the Second Judicial District 
Court, in a divorce action. The relevant facts pertaining to 
each of the issues identified in the Argument Section of this 
Brief are as follows: 
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A. Facts relevant to Dr. Koerpel's claim that the 
Court improperly ordered him to terminate the Defined Benefit 
Pension Plan of his professional corporation and distribute its 
corpus to Mrs. Koerpel: 
1. The Barry J. Koerpel, M.D., Professional 
Corporation is a corporation duly organized under the laws of 
the State of Utah. (Supplemental Record Ex. A). 
2. The plan was created in accordance with the 
requirements of the Internal Revenue Code (§§ 401-405) and the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 
3. The District Court ordered Dr. Koerpel to 
terminate the Plan and distribute $100,000 from the corpus to 
Mrs. Koerpel as part of the Court's property award. (Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1f 7, Record on Appeal, Pages 
211-219). 
4. The District Court found that it had considered 
Dr. Koerpel*s claim that ERISA barred the Court from ordering 
the termination of the Plan and determined that it had the 
authority to order Dr. Koerpel to terminate the Plan and the 
further authority to hold him in contempt if he failed to do 
so. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of May 20, 1986, 
1f 4, Record on Appeal, Pages 441-446. Under the terms of the 
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Plan, neither Dr. Koerpel nor Mrs. Koerpel has reached his 
"earliest retirement age/' the earliest date on which either 
could elect to receive retirement benefits, nor did the Plan 
provide for benefits of the kind awarded by the Court. 
B. Facts relevant to the issue of whether the 
District Court erred in its child custody determination: 
1. Robert McVaugh, Ph.D., the only expert to 
interview Dr. and Mrs. Koerpel and the minor children, 
concluded that the best interests of the minor children would 
be served by having Dr. Koerpel designated as the custodial 
parent and made this recommendation to the Court. (McVaugh 
Evaluation, Supplemental Record Ex. B. 
2. The Court based plaintiffs custody award to Mrs. 
Koerpel on its finding that she was the primary care giver and 
that Dr. Koerpel had failed to demonstrate that he was a 
superior parent to Mrs. Koerpel. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Paragraph 9, Record on Appeal, Pages 
211-219. 
Facts relevant to the issue of whether the District 
Court erred in assigning all business debts to Dr. Koerpel: 
1. Pursuant to a Temporary Stipulation and Order 
entered by Judge Donald Hyde on October 31, 1984, Dr. Koerpel 
was restrained from interfering with Mrs. Koerpel's businesses, 
either directly or indirectly, Record on Appeal, Pages 12-14. 
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2. In an Affidavit dated February 7, 1985, Mrs. 
Koerpel alleged that Dr. Koerpel had prevented her from using 
or occupying "her" office thus preventing her from adequately 
carrying on "her" businesses, Record on Appeal, Pages 18-20. 
On April 22, 1985, Dr. Koerpel filed a Motion with the District 
Court to have a receiver appointed for Meadows Medical 
Services, Inc., one of the entities which Mrs. Koerpel claimed 
to be one of "her" businesses, Record on Appeal, Pages 67-69. 
3. In a hearing before Judge Hyde on May 3, 1985, 
plaintiff's counsel represented to the Court that Mrs. 
Koerpel's business, Meadows Medical Services, Inc., was current 
in the payment of its bills. 
4. In her Affidavit dated October 2, 1985, Mrs. 
Koerpel stated that she had been operating a dialysis clinic 
and receiving income from that clinic. In that Affidavit she 
accused the defendant of intentionally interfering with her 
business by encouraging technicians to compete against her, 
Record on Appeal, Pages 133-136. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. While judges have considerable latitude in 
fashioning property awards in domestic relations proceedings, 
they may not enter orders which would have the effect of 
violating statutes or impairing contracts. Since the enactment 
of ERISA in 1974, courts have wrestled with the issue of 
whether retirement plans created under ERISA are subject to 
domestic relations orders which contemplate benefits other than 
those set forth in the plan. In 1984, Congress laid this issue 
to rest by amending ERISA and creating Qualified Domestic 
Relations Orders (QDRO's). The QDRO amendment preempted state 
domestic relations law insofar as it limited the authority of 
state court justices to award plan benefits to spouses only 
when the QDRO provisions were met. The District Court's Decree 
ordering termination of Dr. Koerpel's professional corporation 
Plan is not a QDRO and hence is unenforceable. 
2. In determining which parent should be awarded 
custody of minor children, the Court must serve the best 
interests of the children. Here, the Court awarded Mrs. 
Koerpel custody based upon a conclusion that she was the 
primary care provider during most of the minor children's lives 
and that there was "value" to be found in continuing the 
custody arrangement in place under the Temporary Custody 
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Order. The Court reached this conclusion against the 
recommendation of Dr. Robert McVaugh, a psychologist and the 
only expert to evaluate both parents and the children. In 
essence, the Court's custody award is based on an invocation of 
a maternal preference rule. This Court has recently repudiated 
use of a material preference rule because it deprives fathers 
of their rights, under the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
3. The District Court erred in assigning all of the 
business debts to Dr. Koerpel. It concluded that Dr. Koerpel 
was the "moving force" behind the businesses and that he is in 
a better position to know what the liabilities of the 
businesses are. This conclusion is wholly unsupported by the 
compelling evidence in the record which documents without 
equivocation that Mrs. Koerpel considered herself to be in 
control of the businesses, even to the extent of obtaining a 
court order prohibiting Dr. Koerpel from "interfering," either 
directly or indirectly, in them. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE 1984 AMENDMENTS TO ERISA PROHIBIT THE ENFORCEMENT 
OF STATE COURT ORDERS WHICH REQUIRE ALIENATION OF 
RETIREMENT PLANS IN A MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
ACT. ACCORDINGLY, THE DISTRICT COURT*S ORDER THAT 
DR. KOERPEL'S PLAN BE TERMINATED IS UNENFORCEABLE. 
The enactment of ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. in 
1974 detonated an explosion of private pension and profit 
sharing plans in the United States. This was due, in great 
measure, to the tax advantages which could be realized by both 
employers and employees who enacted "qualified plans" under the 
Internal Revenue Code and ERISA. Among the prerequisites to 
"qualification" was a requirement that each pension plan 
provide that benefits provided under the plan not be assigned 
or alienated (29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). Additionally, ERISA 
contains a preemption section which declares that "this chapter 
shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they now or 
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described 
(herein) . . . . " (29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
The enactment of ERISA with its anti-alienation and 
preemption provisions had the effect of sending federal pension 
law on a collision course with state domestic relations law. 
In the decade between the adoption of ERISA and the amendment 
creating Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, pension plan 
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administrators often confronted the dilemma of being ordered by 
a state court to pay over proceeds from an ERISA qualified plan 
in direct contravention of federal law and of plan provisions 
prohibiting alienation of benefits. As might be anticipated 
this situation stimulated substantial controversy. A line of 
cases which developed out of this conflict adopted the general 
view that Congress did not intend that ERISA preempt state 
domestic relations law permitting the attachment of benefits 
for the purpose of meeting those obligations. See, Biles v. 
Biles, 163 N.J. Super. 49 (N.J. Super. 1978); In re Marriage of 
Albert, 85 Cal. App. 3d 900 (Cal. App. 1978); Williams v. 
Williams, 163 Cal. App. 3d 793 (Cal. App. 1985). 
In 1984, Congress responded to the uncertainty created 
by the conflict between ERISA and state domestic relations law 
by enacting an amendment to ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)). 
This amendment specified the circumstances under which a state 
court judge could fashion an order in a domestic relations 
action affecting an ERISA qualified plan without running afoul 
of ERISA's preemption provisions. A central component of these 
Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (QDRO's) is that they may 
not require a plan to provide any type or form of benefit not 
otherwise provided by the plan (29 U.SoC, § 1056(d)(3)). In 
other words, ERISA will permit a spouse to share in benefits 
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already contemplated under the terms of the plan, but it will 
not permit a spouse to enjoy benefits not contemplated by the 
plan. 
Unquestionably, our state court judges enjoy broad 
discretion in fashioning property distribution—their 
decision-making guided by general principles of equity. 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977). Within this 
general framework, however, judges are constrained from making 
property awards which violate statutes, impair contracts or are 
unconstitutional. For example, in Berry v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68 
(1981), the Utah Supreme Court reversed what it considered to 
be a well-intentioned property award on the grounds that it 
impermissibly transgressed prohibitions imposed by Utah's 
partnership law against the sale of partnership assets. 
Similarly, in this case, the District Court 
unequivocally stated in its Finding of Fact No. 4 of May 20, 
1986, that federal law did not ''prohibit the Court from 
exercising its personal jurisdiction over Dr. Koerpel in 
ordering him to terminate the Plan." Under the clear language 
of the 1984 amendment to ERISA, this finding is incorrect. 
Nothing in the Plan contemplates a benefit to either Dr. or 
Mrs. Koerpel in the form of the property distribution set forth 
by the Court, furthermore, neither Dr. Koerpel nor Mrs. Koerpel 
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is currently eligible to receive benefits under the terms of 
ERISA or the Plan. For this reason, the issue of the property 
distribution under the Decree of Divorce must be remanded to 
the District Court for redetermination in accordance with 
equity and applicable federal law. 
II 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
CUSTODY OF JOSHUA JOHN KOERPEL AND 
BARDIN BLAKE KOERPEL TO MRS. KOERPEL. 
In this domestic action, Dr. Koerpel sought an award 
of custody of his two sons, Joshua John Koerpel and Bardin 
Blake Koerpel. At trial, the Court received testimony and a 
written evaluation from Dr. Robert McVaugh, a psychologist and 
professor at Weber State College. After interviewing and 
administering numerous tests to Dr. and Mrs. Koerpel and each 
of their children, Dr. McVaugh concluded that the interests of 
the Koerpel boys would be served by awarding custody to Dr. 
Koerpel. 
The Court rejected Dr. McVaugh's recommendation. As 
stated in its Findings of Fact, the Court based its award of 
custody to Mrs. Koerpel on a determination that Mrs. Koerpel 
had been the primary care provider for the children during most 
of their lives and that the custody arrangement which had been 
put in place by the Temporary Custody Order entered more than a 
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year before, appeared to be working. Findings and Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, paragraph 9. Record on Appeal, Pages 
211-219. For the reasons that follow, neither of these grounds 
is adequate to overturn the recommendation of Dr. McVaugh. 
First, it is improper to base a permanent custody 
award upon a finding that the children have been prospering 
under the terms of a temporary award. Temporary custody awards 
are routinely granted without the benefit of psychological 
evaluations, home studies, or the other recognized evidentiary 
bases for determining which parent can better serve the 
interests of the child as custodian. As a practical matter, 
they are exercises in expediency typically continuing the 
custodial status quo. Rarely are they supported by express 
findings of the Court. Certainly, if Dr. Koerpel had been the 
temporary custodial parent, that arrangement too would have 
"worked". 
Dr. Koerpel was not, however, afforded an equal 
opportunity to demonstrate that the Koerpel boys would have 
prospered under his temporary custodial care. In short, the 
Court seized on a wholly fortuitous event—the designation of 
Mrs. Koerpel as the temporary custodial parent—and elevated it 
to the status of an evidentiary basis for an award of permanent 
custody. To permit a party who is granted temporary custody to 
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enjoy a presumption that she is entitled to an award of 
permanent custody is to greatly increase the stakes for the 
contestants in a temporary custody proceeding. Such a rule of 
law would necessarily create a more contentious environment, 
replete with demands for exhaustive evaluations, at a 
preliminary stage in the divorce proceedings when accommodation 
and expediency are at a premium. 
The findings of fact also suggest that Mrs. Koerpel 
has been the primary care provider for the children. However, 
it is impossible to tell from the findings whether the trial 
court based its primary care finding on a functional analysis 
of primary care, or on visceral, gender-based reasoning. The 
only finding related to primary care concludes that the parties 
were approximately even in giving personal versus surrogate 
care. 
In the recent case of Pusey v. Pusey, No. 20365 (Utah, 
August 18, 1986), this Court struck down the vestiges of 
maternal preference guidelines in this state; custody decisions 
are properly based only on functional considerations. Without 
further factual explanation of the trial court's primary care 
finding, its custody decision is tainted by the outdated 
maternal preference rule and should be remanded for further 
consideration. 
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Finally, the Court defended its custody award by 
stating that it was not satisfied "that the evidence shows the 
defendant (Dr. Koerpel) would be a superior parent to the 
extent that the Court should move the children from the 
plaintiff into the defendant's custody." (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law 1f/9, Record on Appeal, Pages 211-219). This 
statement demonstrates that the Court was imposing on Dr. 
Koerpel an impermissible burden of proving that he was a 
superior parent to Mrs. Koerpel. Of course, custody is to be 
determined with a view towards serving the best interests of 
the child. Here, the Court explicitly elevated the interests 
of the mother, Mrs. Koerpel, over the interests of either the 
children or Dr. Koerpel by requiring that Dr. Koerpel make a 
showing that he was a superior parent before considering him 
for a custody award. This represents a clear misstatement of 
Utah domestic relations law. It also reinforces the Court's 
improper placement of emphasis on temporary custody awards. 
Based on the Court's finding, the law in the State of Utah 
would appear to place on the parent not granted temporary 
custody the burden of showing that he or she was a superior 
parent when the time came to contest permanent custody. For 
these reasons, the Court committed error and abuse of 
discretion in awarding custody of Joshua John Koerpel and 
Bardin Blake Koerpel to Mrs. Koerpel. 
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Ill 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY INEQUITABLY ASSIGNING 
ALL BUSINESS LIABILITIES TO DR. KOERPEL 
The District Court found that Dr. Koerpel was the 
"moving force behind all of the business ventures so he will 
inherit all business assets and all business liabilities 
. . . . The defendant (Dr. Koerpel) is in a better position to 
know what the liabilities are and to handle the liabilities." 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1f 7, Record on Appeal, 
Pages 211-219). The businesses addressed in this finding were 
a hemodialysis clinic, Meadows Medical Services, Inc., and a 
tanning salon, Touch of Tan, Inc. In the interval since the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce, numerous lawsuits have been 
commenced by parties claiming to be creditors of these business 
entities. In addition, Mrs. Koerpel has forwarded to Dr. 
Koerpel a substantial number of bills incurred and unpaid by 
Meadows Medical Services, Inc. 
A brief review of the record in this action amply 
demonstrates why the Trial Court's finding that Dr. Koerpel 
should assume the business debts because of his "better 
position to know" the nature of the liabilities is wholly 
without foundation. On October 30, 1984, Mrs. Koerpel signed a 
Verified Complaint for Divorce and Temporary Stipulation. Both 
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papers seek to have Dr. Koerpel restrained from interfering 
with Mrs. Koerpel's businesses (Meadows Medical Services and 
Touch of Tan, Inc.), either directly or indirectly. It was 
with considerable zeal that Mrs. Koerpel sought to insulate 
these businesses from any involvement or scrutiny by Dr. 
Koerpel. On February 7, 1985, Mrs. Koerpel signed an Affidavit 
in support of an Order to Show Cause in which she alleged that 
Dr. Koerpel had prevented her from using or occupying her 
office, which has prevented her from adequately carrying on her 
businesses (Record on Appeal, Pages 18-20). On April 22, 1985, 
Dr. Koerpel filed a Motion to Appoint a Receiver for Meadows 
Medical Services. This Motion was based upon the Affidavit of 
one of Meadows' employees, Larry Carlson. Mr. Carlson 
testified to extensive acts of mismanagement of Meadows by Mrs. 
Koerpel. Mrs. Koerpel responded by filing an Order to Show 
Cause supported by her Affidavit which reaffirmed her request 
for the entry of an order preventing Dr. Koerpel from 
interfering with Mrs. Koerpel*s business known as Meadows 
Medical Services, Inc. in any way, either directly or 
indirectly. 
At a subsequent hearing on May 3, 1985, Mrs. Koerpel's 
counsel represented to the Court that as of that date, Meadows 
Medical Service was current in the payment of its bills and 
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that so long as Dr. Koerpel continued to make his child support 
payments under the Court's Temporary Order, Mrs. Koerpel would 
not be required to take money from Meadows to support herself. 
It is clear that from the outset of this divorce 
action, Mrs. Koerpel has taken the position that the businesses 
in question were hers. On numerous occasions, she has sought 
to seek the intervention of the Court to prohibit Dr. Koerpel 
from exercising any control over the management of these 
entities. At trial, Mrs. Koerpel presented documentary 
evidence in the form of a Statement of Net Assets. On this 
exhibit, Mrs. Koerpel again reflected no existing debt for 
either Meadows Medical Services, Inc. or Touch of Tan's parent, 
Streb-Kor, Inc. Notwithstanding the presence of unequivocal 
evidence that Mrs. Koerpel exercised exclusive control over 
these businesses, and her testimony that they were debt-free, 
Mrs. Koerpel initiated post-trial proceedings against Dr. 
Koerpel in which she sought to have him held in contempt of 
court for allegedly failing to pay a multitude of business 
obligations (see Affidavit of Judith Koerpel, March 6, 1986). 
The Affidavit of Barry Koerpel dated January 28, 1986, details 
many of the obligations which Mrs. Koerpel concealed from the 
Trial Court but for which she now seeks to have Dr. Koerpel 
stand accountable. 
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in its decision to order Dr. 
Koerpel, in his position as administrator of a professional 
corporation Pension Plan, to terminate the plan. The Court's 
Order violates ERISA, the Federal statute governing such 
plans. Unqualified Orders such as these were specifically 
pre-empted by Congress to preserve the integrity of pension 
plans and benefits. The decision of the District Court on this 
issue was an error of law, and should be reversed. 
The divorce decree in this case saddled Dr. Koerpel 
with obligations of which he was not aware and which he was in 
fact prohibited by judicial decree from controlling or 
mitigating. An inequity of this magnitude constitutes an abuse 
of discretion. The Court should therefore reverse and remand 
for redetermination of the property award consistent with a 
finding that Mrs. Koerpel, rather than Dr. Koerpel, controlled 
the fate of "her" businesses. 
The Court should also reverse and remand on the issue 
of child custody. The Court's decision on this issue was based 
at least in part on impermissible considerations. These 
considerations were allowed to override the testimony of an 
unbiased professional custody evaluator that Dr. Koerpel would 
be a superior primary care provider. Because the findings of 
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the trial Court do not indicate with sufficient specificity how 
much weight was given to the impermissible considerations, the 
case should be remanded with instructions to base the custody 
award solely on functional factors. Only be requiring specific 
findings of functional facts can this Court ensure that custody 
awards will serve the best interests of children rather than 
mirror gender-based stereotypes. 
Respectfully submitted this '2n day of August, 1986. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By. 4;H 
R&nald £. Nelrriiig 
Robert G. Wing 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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29 § 1056 LABOR Ch. 18 
(d) Assignment or alienation of plan benefits 
(1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan 
may not be assigned or alienated. 
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection, there shall not 
be taken into account any voluntary and revocable assignment of not to 
exceed 10 percent of any benefit payment, or of any irrevocable assignment 
or alienation of benefits executed before September 2, 1974. The preceding 
sentence shall not apply to any assignment or alienation made for the 
purposes of defraying plan administration costs. For purposes of this 
paragraph a loan made to a participant or beneficiary shall not be treated as 
an assignment or alienation if such loan is secured by the participant's 
accrued nonforfeitable benefit and is exempt from the tax imposed by 
section 4975 of Title 26 (relating to tax on prohibited transactions) by 
reason of section 4975(d)(1) of Title 26. 
(3)(A) Paragraph (1) shall apply to the creation, assignment, or recogni-
tion of a right to any benefit payable with respect to a participant pursuant 
to a domestic relations order, except that paragraph (1) shall not apply if 
the order is determined to be a qualified domestic relations order. Each 
pension plan shall provide for the payment of benefits in accordance with 
the applicable requirements of any qualified domestic relations order. 
(B) For purposes of this paragraph— 
(i) the term "qualified domestic relations order" means a domestic 
relations order— 
(I) which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate 
payee's right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, 
receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a 
participant under a plan, and 
(II) with respect to which the requirements of subparagraphs 
(C) and (D) are met, and 
(ii) the term "domestic relations order" means any judgment, decree, 
or order (including approval of a property settlement agreement) 
which— 
(I) relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, 
or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or 
other dependent of a participant, and 
(II) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (includ-
ing a community property law). 
(O A domestic relations order meets the requirements of this subpara-
graph only if such order clearly specifies— 
(i) the name and the last known mailing address (if any) of the 
participant and the name and mailing address of each alternate payee 
covered by the order, 
(ii) the amount or percentage of the participant's benefits to be paid 
by the plan to each such alternate payee, or the manner in which such 
amount or percentage is to be determined, 
(iii) the number of payments or period to which such order applies, 
and 
152 
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(iv) each plan to which such order applies. 
(D) A domestic relations order meets the requirements of this subpara-
graph only if such order— 
(i) does not require a plan to provide any type or form of benefit, or 
any option, not otherwise provided under the plan, 
(ii) does not require the plan to provide increased benefits (deter-
mined on the basis of actuarial value), and 
(iii) does not require the payment of benefits to an alternate payee 
which are required to be paid to another alternate payee under another 
order previously determined to be a qualified domestic relations order. 
(E)(i) In the case of any payment before a participant has separated from 
service, a domestic relations order shall not be treated as failing to meet the 
requirements of clause (i) of subparagraph (D) solely because such order 
requires that payment of benefits be made to an alternate payee— 
(I) on or after the date on which the participant attains (or would 
have attained) the earliest retirement age, 
(II) as if the participant had retired on the date on which such 
payment is to begin under such order (but taking into account only the 
present value of benefits actually accrued and not taking into account 
the present value of any employer subsidy for early retirement), and 
(III) in any form in which such benefits may be paid under the plan 
to the participant (other than in the form of a joint and survivor 
annuity with respect to the alternate payee and his or her subsequent 
spouse). 
For purposes of subclause (II), the interest rate assumption used in deter-
mining the present value shall be the interest rate specified in the plan or, if 
no rate is specified, 5 percent. 
(ii) For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "earliest retirement age" 
has the meaning given such term by section 1055 (h)(3) of this title, except 
that in the case of any individual account plan, the earliest retirement age 
shall be the date which is 10 years before the normal retirement age. 
(F) To the extent provided in any qualified domestic relations order— 
(i) the former spouse of a participant shall be treated as a surviving 
spouse of such participant for purposes of section 1055 of this title, and 
(ii) if married for at least 1 year, the former spouse shall be treated 
as meeting the requirements of section 1055(f) of this title. 
(G)(i) In the case of any domestic relations order received by a plan— 
(I) the plan administrator shall promptly notify the participant and 
any other alternate payee of the receipt of such order and the plan's 
procedures for determining the qualified status of domestic relations 
orders, and 
(II) within a reasonable period after receipt of such order, the plan 
administrator shall determine whether such order is a qualified domes-
tic relations order and notify the participant and each alternate payee 
of such determination. 
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(ii) Each plan shall establish reasonable procedures to determine the 
qualified status of domestic relations orders and to administer distributions 
under such qualified orders. Such procedures— 
(I) shall be in writing, 
(II) shall provide for the notification of each person specified in a 
domestic relations order as entitled to payment of benefits under the 
plan (at the address included in the domestic relations order) of such 
procedures promptly upon receipt by the plan of the domestic relations 
order, and 
(III) shall permit an alternate payee to designate a representative for 
receipt of copies of notices that are sent to the alternate payee with 
respect to a domestic relations order. 
(H)(i) During any period in which the issue of whether a domestic 
relations order is a qualified domestic relations order is being determined 
(by the plan administrator, by a court of competent jurisdiction, or other-
wise), the plan administrator shall segregate in a separate account in the 
plan or in an escrow account the amounts which would have been payable 
to the alternate payee during such period if the order had been determined 
to be a qualified domestic relations order. 
(ii) If within 18 months the order (or modification thereof) is determined 
to be a qualified domestic relations order, the plan administrator shall pay 
the segregated amounts (plus any interest thereon) to the person or persons 
entitled thereto. 
(iii) If within 18 months— 
(I) it is determined that the order is not a qualified domestic 
relations order, or 
(II) the issue as to whether such order is a qualified domestic 
relations order is not resolved, 
then the plan administrator shall pay the segregated amounts (plus any 
interest thereon) to the person or persons who would have been entitled to 
such amounts if there had been no order. 
(iv) Any determination that an order is a qualified domestic relations 
order which is made after the close of the 18-month period shall be applied 
prospectively only. 
(I) If a plan fiduciary acts in accordance with part 4 of this subtitle in— 
(i) treating a domestic relations order as being (or not being) a 
qualified domestic relations order, or 
(ii) taking action under subparagraph (H), 
then the plan's obligation to the participant and each alternate payee shall 
be discharged to the extent of any payment made pursuant to such act. 
(J) A person who is an alternate payee under a qualified domestic 
relations order shall be considered for purposes of any provision of this 
chapter a beneficiary under the plan. Nothing in the preceding sentence 
shall permit a requirement under section 1301 of this title of the payment of 
more than 1 premium with respect to a participant for any period. 
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(K) The term "alternate payee" means any spouse, former spouse, child, 
or other dependent of a participant who is recognized by a domestic 
relations order as having a right to receive all, or a portion of, the benefits 
payable under a plan with respect to such participant. 
(L) In prescribing regulations under this paragraph, the Secretary shall 
consult with the Secretary of the Treasury. 
(Pub.L. 93-406, Title I, § 206, Sept. 2, 1974, 88 Stat. 864; Pub.L. 98-397, Title I, 
§ 104(a), Aug. 23, 1984, 98 Stat. 1433.) 
Historical Note 
References in Text. The Social Security 
Act, referred to in subsec. (b), is Act Aug. 14, 
1935, c. 531, 49 Stat. 620, as amended. Title 
II of the Social Security Act is classified 
generally to subchapter II (section 401 et 
seq.) of chapter 7 of Title 42, The Public 
Health and Welfare. For complete classifica-
tion of this Act to the Code, see section 1305 
of Title 42 and Tables volume. 
The Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, re-
ferred to in subsec. (b), is Act Aug. 29, 1935, 
c. 812, 49 Stat. 867, as amended generally by 
Act June 24, 1937, c. 382, part I, 50 Stat. 
307, and which was classified principally to 
subchapter III (section 228a et seq.) of chap-
ter 9 of Title 45, Railroads. The Railroad 
Retirement Act of 1937 was amended gener-
ally and redesignated the Railroad Retire-
ment Act of 1974 by Pub.L. 93-445, title I, 
Oct. 16, 1974, 88 Stat. 1305. The Railroad 
Retirement Act of 1974 is classified generally 
to subchapter IV (section 231 et seq.) of 
chapter 9 of Title 45. For complete classifi-
cation of these acts to the Code, see Tables 
volume. 
1984 Amendment. Subsec. (d)(3). Pub.L. 
98-397 added par. (3). 
Effective Date of 1984 Amendment. 
Amendment by Pub.L. 98-397, applicable to 
plan years beginning after December 31, 
1984, except as otherwise provided in sections 
302(b), (c), (d) and 303 of Pub.L. 98-397, see 
section 302(a) of Pub.L. 98-397, set out as a 
note under section 1001 of this title. 
Effective Date. Subsecs. (a) to (c) of this 
section applicable in the case of plan years 
beginning after Sept. 2, 1974, except as other-
wise provided in section 1061 of this title, see 
section 1061(a) of this title. 
Subsec. (d) of this section applicable with 
respect to plan years beginning after Dec. 31, 
1975, except as otherwise provided in section 
1061(d) of this title, see section 1061(b)(1) of 
this title. 
In the case of plans in existence on Jan. 1, 
1974, this section applicable in the case of 
plan years beginning after Dec. 31, 1975, 
except as otherwise provided in section 
1061(c) and (d) of this title, see section 
1061(b)(2) of this title. 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub.L. 93-406, see 1974 U.S. 
Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 4639. See, 
also, Pub.L. 98-397, 1984 U.S. Code Cong, 
and Adm.News, p. 2547. 
Cross References 
Effective date, see section 1061 of this title. 
Minimum vesting standards, see section 1053 of this title. 
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